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Abstract 
In response to the Fintech trend, an ongoing debate in the banking industry is how to 
design the new-generation interbank retail payment and settlement system. We propose a 
two-stage analytical model that takes into account the value–risk tradeoff in the new 
payment system design, as well as banks’ participation incentives and adoption timing 
decisions. We find that, as the system base value increases, banks tend to synchronize their 
investment and adoption decisions. When the system base value is low and banks are 
heterogeneous, bank association ownership maximizes social welfare. When both the 
system base value and bank heterogeneity are moderate, government mandate leads to the 
socially optimal solution. When the system base value is high and banks are relatively 
homogenous, government ownership is socially optimal. We offer important policy 
implications regarding the optimal system design and the government regulator’s role in 
shaping the banking industry in future financial innovation. 
Keywords:  Fintech, Payment and Settlement Systems, Economic Incentives, Mechanism 
Design, Analytical Modeling 
 
Introduction 
Technology is reshaping the landscape of retail payments. Payment innovations such as Square, Apple Pay, 
AliPay, and PayPal are flourishing. They make transactions convenient and easy, provide tailored services 
for e-commerce, and spur the growth in retail payment volumes. These new financial technology (FinTech) 
solutions are quickly gaining market momentum. For example, in April 2019, PayPal announced that it has 
277 million user accounts across 202 countries worldwide, handling a total payment volume of $161 billion 
per quarter;1 and AliPay has over 700 million annual active users by September 2018, indicating an increase 
of more than 200 million year on year.2 
The emergence of new FinTech payment solutions have set new expectations for timely payment settlement 
to meet the needs of consumers and businesses, challenging the traditional interbank retail payment 
settlement system, in which payments are accumulated for end-of-day netting, known as deferred net 
settlement (DNS). DNS unavoidably leads to delay in settlement and thus freezes a large amount of money 
in the post-trade process. When new technologies enabling Fintech innovators and non-bank competitors 
to enter the payment and settlement industry, in order to defend their central market position in this long-
standing territory, banks are actively pursuing the implementation of new technologies to expedite 
settlement and ease transactions.  
Thus far, different entities have taken different actions to enhance interbank retail payments and settlement 
services around the world, including the upgrade of existing infrastructure or building new infrastructure 
                                                             
1 https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/24/venmo-has-40-million-users-paypal-reveals-for-first-time.html 
2 https://www.pymnts.com/news/mobile-payments/2018/alipay-users-ant-financial-blockchain-ai-iot/ 
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to expedite settlement speed and add state-of-art features supporting innovative payments such as mobile 
payments. In some countries, the policy makers such as the central bank take charge. This is called 
government ownership structure. For example, In China, the Internet Banking Payments System (IBPS), 
which offers real-time retail payments settlement, is regulated by People’s Bank of China and operated by 
China National Clearing Centre. In U.S., the Fed started an initiative in 2015 for improving the U.S. payment 
system with a dedicated task force for faster payments.3 The project has since reached several milestones 
with an improved payment system still in progress.  
In other cases, major banks and financial institutions formed an association and responded to the need for 
change. This is called private ownership structure. For example, the New Payments Platform (NPP) of 
Australia is the new fast retail payment system built by a consortium of Australian financial institutions. 
Also, Bankgirot, jointly owned by the Swedish banks, is the only clearing house for retail payments in 
Sweden. It managed and developed the mobile payments solution Swish, and launched a new payment 
system, Payments in Real Time (PRT), in 2012 under competitive pressure from non-bank payment 
providers.4  
In addition to the different ownership structures, there is ongoing debate regarding how the innovative 
retail payment services should be deployed. Not only that the innovations require substantial infrastructure 
investments, but the scope and timing of adoption, as well as the design characteristics of the innovative 
payment services, vary across jurisdictions. Different environments, competitive pressure and business 
needs would influence when and in what form the innovative retail payment services emerge. Table A1 in 
the Appendix provides some examples of advanced retail payment system innovations in leading countries.  
In this research, we study how banks should build their innovative retail payment and settlement services 
in response to the FinTech trend. We propose a two-stage analytical model to compare the design and 
performance of innovative retail payment systems under two types of ownerships, namely, the government 
ownership and private ownership. We examine the optimal system design and banks’ participating 
incentives and timing decisions. We aim to answer the following questions: What are the optimal system 
configurations, in terms of system capacity to support innovative payments, under each ownership 
structure? What are banks’ participating incentives and strategies under each ownership structure, given 
that banks have heterogeneous capabilities of handling liquidity risk in settlement? What are the policy 
implications of the different ownership structures? When would bank associations be more effective in 
aligning banks’ economic incentives? And under what conditions would government mandate lead to 
socially optimal outcomes? 
We identify three types of equilibrium, and under each we derive the optimal system design and 
corresponding participation strategies of banks. We find that, when the system is designed with low 
capability, banks with low liquidity cost will participate in the early stage of system building, while banks 
with high liquidity risk will not use the system even if it is offered for free in the later stage. When the system 
is designed with medium capability, banks with low liquidity risks will participate in the early stage of 
system building, and banks with high liquidity risk will adopt the system in the later stage, by paying 
appropriate fees if the system is under private ownership. Finally, when the system is designed with high 
capability, all banks will synchronize their timing of participation and collectively engage in the new system 
development in the early stage. Our analysis shows that, regardless of the ownership type, when the value 
of payment service increases, the owner will always try to attract more banks to participate at an earlier 
time, and the total payoff of the new system will always increase. The optimal system capacity chosen by 
the owner, however, does not monotonically increase in the system value. When the system base value is 
relatively high, we find that the owner will deliberately build a system with lower capacity, in order to 
balance the high risk banks’ costs and thus to encourage them to join the innovation. 
We further identify some exogenous factors that play an important role in the system design. We find that 
the heterogeneity of banks matters. It can have direct implications for the system liquidity and performance. 
The system owner must carefully take into account the variation in banks’ tolerance for liquidity risk in 
optimizing the system design. More specifically, when banks in the underlying financial ecosystem are more 
similar, the owner should build the system with higher capability, supporting more innovative payment 
features and faster settlement, and should incentivize more banks to participate or co-build this system. In 
                                                             
3 https://fedpaymentsimprovement.org/faster-payments/ 
4 http://www.autogiro.se/en/about-bankgirot/about-us/bankgirots-history/ 
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addition, when banks are quite homogeneous, private ownership is suboptimal compared with the 
government ownership, but when banks are very heterogeneous, private ownership achieves socially 
efficient outcome. That is because in the latter case, the private bank association can always employ the 
proper price to exclude or encourage the participation of some high-risk banks.  
Finally, we evaluate the operational and economic efficacy and the implications of each ownership structure 
to shed light on the related policy issues. Our results suggest that, under some conditions, it is socially 
optimal to have government intervention for a successful transformation of the retail payment and 
settlement system. For example, when banks are moderately different in their capability to handle liquidity 
risk, we propose the government mandate policy that can effectively orchestrate banks’ actions and align 
their incentives to co-invest in a system with faster settlement speed and more innovative features, and thus 
help banks better respond to the FinTech new comers’ competition.  
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. Section 2 provides relevant literature review. Section 3 
describes our model setup. Section 4 formulates and analyzes the decision-making problem under each 
ownership structure. Section 5 presents our main results and insights. In Section 6, we summarize our 
findings and discuss some policy implications.  
Literature Review 
Several streams of literature are closely related to our work: interbank payment and settlement systems 
design, FinTech innovation, and technology adoption. We briefly review the related literature in each of 
these areas.  
Core interbank payment systems are usually classified as either “large-value” or “retail” payment systems, 
depending on the primary types of transactions (CPSS 2011, 2012). Because large-value payment systems 
play a key role in the financial economy, many central banks have adopted the real-time gross settlement 
(RTGS) systems (e.g., Fedwire), which eliminate the credit risk between participants by allowing for the 
final and irrevocable settlement of each payment (Kahn and Roberds 2001). Because each payment has to 
be settled on a gross basis, RTGS systems are very demanding in terms of liquidity. To save liquidity, small-
value retail payments are normally processed using deferred net settlement (DNS) systems (e.g., the 
Automated Clearing House system), in which payments are settled periodically on a net basis (Johnson et 
al. 2004). Only recently, the exponential growth of retail volume and value, together with the desire for 
FinTech innovation, has called for a transformation in the design of retail payment and settlement systems 
worldwide (Tompkins and Olivares 2016).  
An emerging stream of FinTech research studies a variety of innovative technology applications in the 
financial industry (Ancri 2016). Most of these studies focus on understanding the economic value and risk 
of FinTech innovations and examining their disruptive impact on the traditional financial institutions and 
banks. For example, Allison (2016) documents banks’ adoption of blockchain technology and their 
evaluation of the technological effectiveness in facilitating trade of debt instruments. Bohme et al. (2015), 
Evans (2014), and Maloumby-Baka and Kingombe (2015) examine the adoption of Bitcoin in the remittance 
services from the cost and benefit perspective and evaluate its competition effects on banks in this market. 
As another example, peer-to-peer (P2P) lending is one of the most prominent innovations in consumer 
finance. A number of positive economic effects have been identified. Balyuk and Davydenko (2016) provide 
evidence that the screening ability of investors in P2P lending is better than traditional credit 
intermediaries, which is consistent with the view that public markets can be superior to financial 
intermediaries in providing funding (Allen and Gale 1999). Jefery and Arnold (2014) highlights 
inefficiencies and frictions that P2P lending can overcome or mitigate. And many others (Duart et al. 2012, 
Michels 2012) report evidence that additional soft information arises in P2P lending and thus reducing the 
extent of information asymmetry in the traditional consumer lending market. Almost all recent FinTech 
research suggests that the benefits of such disruptive technologies outweigh the associated costs, and hence 
impose potential threats to traditional bank services. However, there is almost no guidance about how 
traditional banks can effectively respond to such challenges. Our research contributes to this literature by 
explicitly modeling banks’ strategic reaction to the FinTech trend and shows how the business value and 
social welfare can be improved if banks choose to actively invest in the new technology to improve their 
financial service capabilities.  
Following the FinTech trend, some recent research has studied the innovative payments and settlements 
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system. Liu et al. (2015) examine recent changes in the payment sector. They apply technology ecosystems 
and paths of influence analysis to explain the development of mobile payments. They show that both 
competition and cooperation always coexist among financial institutions during the mobile payments 
evolution process, and suggest the importance of regulatory roles in driving or delaying such innovation. 
Khapko and Zoican (2016) claim that the current settlement process features several days of delay and thus 
is inconsistent with the fast-paced market, while immediate settlement over-emphasizes the counterparty 
risk and leads to sub-optimal liquidity on banks. They thus propose a “smart settlement” design, which 
allows counterparties to determine flexible time-to-settlement on a trade-by-trade basis. In addition, Guo 
et al. (2015) also recognize the drawbacks of both the DNS and RTGS designs for retail payments. They 
propose a hybrid faster payments settlement system that relies on a centrally managed priority queue to 
achieve superior settlement efficiency. The new settlement mechanism is able to balance the benefits of fast 
settlements and the increased liquidity pressure associated with more frequent settlements. Using large 
scale simulation and controlled experiments, they show that the proposed settlement system can effectively 
reduce delay cost, improve liquidity utilization, and minimize operational cost.  
Our paper also relates to the literature on technology adoption. One prominent theory for adoption model 
is the technology, organization, and environment (TOE) framework by Tornatzky and Fleischer (1990). 
They argue that an organization’s technological innovation decision making depends on three aspects: the 
organization’s idiosyncratic characteristics, the technological context (such as the risk and value of the 
specific technology), and external environment (such as industry structure and government regulation). We 
have considered all these aspects in our study. Kim et al. (2007) develop the value-based model to explain 
the adoption of Mobile Internet as a new information and communication technology from the value 
maximization perspective. Hannan and McDowell (1984) and Saloner and Shepard (1995) examine banks’ 
technology adoption behavior. They find that larger banks and banks operating in more concentrated 
markets have a higher probability of adopting the automatic teller machine. Clemons and Weber (1996) 
show that the regulatory environment shapes banks’ adoption decision of alternative security trading 
systems. Several other research papers further investigate the optimal timing of technology adoption (Katz 
and Shapiro 1984, Farzin et al. 1998, Choi and Thum 1998). They show that multiple factors, such as 
uncertainties about the speed of innovation arrival, the organization’s initial technological attributes, the 
value of the new technology, strategic interaction in the market, network externalities, and environmental 
policy commitment, will all affect the adoption strategy and timing decision. Specifically, several works 
(Nelson et al. 1993, Newell et al. 1999, Kerr and Newell 2003) show that policy-induced adoption could be 
economically efficient, and thus government regulation together with some special economic instruments, 
such as tax, tradable permits, or subsidies, should be used to provide incentives for technology adoption.  
With the rapid advancement in information technology, many new business models emerge. Recent studies 
in the Information Systems field have investigated technology adoption in various new contexts, such as 
open source software development (Peng and Dey 2013), digital health records (Ozdemir et al. 2011), 
electronic payments systems (Plouffe et al. 2001, Bapna et al. 2011), mobile apps (Jung et al. 2019), and 
cloud IT services (Retana et al. 2018), to name a few. Our work complements this line of new IT adoption 
research by studying heterogeneous banks’ technology adoption strategy and timing decision, based on 
value, cost and risk trade-off of the new technology, as well as the banks’ interactions among themselves.  
The Model Setup 
The initiative of a new retail payment and settlement system aims to provide end-users with instant 
transaction confirmation, secure payment and settlement service, fast payment processing, and funds 
availability for the payee. When building an innovative and fast retail payments system, a number of 
important issues needs to be taken into consideration. 
System Capability. A key design variable is system capability, which can be measured by payments 
features and functions in several dimensions such as high speed of settlement, 24x7x365 availability, 
support for state-of-art payment solutions (e.g., B2B, P2P, mobile, etc.), adoption of ISO20022 standard, 
and support for authentication, transaction notification and documentation. Please see Table A2 in the 
Appendix for a list of system capabilities in advanced retail payment systems. We denote q as the system 
capability. The more payment features and functionalities that are included in the system design, and the 
faster speed of settlement, the higher the system capability.  
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System Value. Settling a payment request completes the underlying business transaction, releases money 
that otherwise will be locked in the settlement process, and fulfills end-users’ demand. Hence, there is value 
associated with the payment service completion. Such a value could be both tangible and intangible. For 
example, when the involved cash is released from the settlement process, it could be used for other 
investment opportunities, and thus generates monetary value. When the end-user’s (individual customer, 
merchants, etc.) demand is fulfilled and transaction is done, it not only generates business value, but also 
enhances the relationship between the bank and end-users, and thus brings intangible value to the bank. 
In the new payment network, banks mutually benefit from the ability to send and receive payments in a 
timely fashion, and thus they perceive a common system-wide base value 𝑣. The magnitude of the base 
value of payment services is related to factors such as the network-wide, different types of the transaction 
requests, total number of transactions and the amounts involved in the transaction requests. In reality, this 
parameter 𝑣 can be calibrated by the expected benefit of payment services based on the overall transaction 
types and volume in the payment network. 
A high-capability system would better serve the banks’ customers and generate higher value. For example, 
a faster settlement releases the money quickly and thus end users are able to get cash earlier for other 
opportunities; a settlement system supporting innovative payments models such as mobile payments has a 
high perceived value due to the convenience offered to users; and the improved payment security creates 
value for consumers, which, in turn, enhances bank-and-customer relationship and eventually brings 
higher business value to the banks. Denote the total value from the new retail payment and settlement 
system as 𝑉(𝑞) = 𝑣𝑞 , where 𝑣  is the base value parameter indicating the benefits related to payment 
services. We assume the higher the system capability, the higher the total value of the system. 
Cost and Risk. The payment and settlement system requires a central infrastructure, which connects all 
participating banks to support faster authorization, clearing, settlement of each money transfer, as well as 
necessary functional improvements for a more convenient and secure settlement. This could be done 
through enhancing an existing system or building a brand new system, both requiring a large amount of 
infrastructure investment cost. We assume the infrastructure cost is a quadratic function of the system 
capability, 𝐶(𝑞) = () 𝑞). Parameter 𝑘 measures sensitivity of the cost increase when the system capability q 
increases. Based on our industry consultation experience, such fixed infrastructure cost is often equally 
shared among the parties who collectively build the system.  
Once the new system is built, banks incur several types of costs. First, a bank might need to pay fees to 
access the settlement service, depending on the ownership of the system. For example, when the system is 
owned by a private bank association, the member banks in the association share the infrastructure cost, 
and non-member banks often will be charged a participating fee 𝑝 for using the new settlement services. On 
the other hand, if the system is owned by the government, the government could charge a fixed annual 
maintenance fee for each bank using the system; alternatively, the government could also absorb the 
maintenance cost by itself. In this work, we adopt the second approach; that is, once the system is built, it 
is provided as public goods to all banks without a fee.  
The second type of cost is the liquidity cost in settling payments. Typically, a bank is required to pledge cash 
collateral into its settlement account held at the central bank. When the money at its settlement account is 
not enough for payments clearing, liquidity shock occurs. In such a case, the bank will first need to borrow 
money to support the payment processing and then pay back (with interest) afterwards. This results in 
liquidity cost for the bank. As the speed of settlement increases, banks are more likely to experience liquidity 
shocks. This is because an expedited system settles payments requests in a timely manner by shortening 
the netting cycle. As a result, banks have less opportunity to find offsetting payments that would otherwise 
be possible in longer netting cycles. Therefore, in a faster settlement system, banks are more likely to 
encounter liquidity shocks and face higher expected liquidity cost. Based on our review and study of the 
payments industry, high liquidity cost is the largest concern during the settlement process in practice. 
Therefore, we model the main operational cost as the liquidity cost (due to liquidity shocks) that is born by 
each participating bank. We denote the unit liquidity cost as 𝐿. 
In reality, banks are heterogeneous in their ability to meet the liquidity requirements. For example, large 
banks typically have a huge amount of funds available to maintain the business stability, and their ability 
to satisfy liquidity demand is typically higher than the small ones which have limited capital and are more 
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likely to incur liquidity shocks. To simplify, we distinguish banks into two types: a 𝜆 ∈ (0,1) proportion of 
banks has the probability of 𝜃3 to incur liquidity shock, and a 1 − 𝜆 proportion of banks has the probability 𝜃5, and 0 < 𝜃3 < 𝜃5 < 1. We call the former low-risk type and the latter high-risk type. In practice, we can 
think of large banks the low-risk type and small banks the high-risk type. So, for a bank with type i, where 𝑖 ∈ {ℎ, 𝑙}, its expected liquidity cost under a system with capacity 𝑞	is 𝜃=𝑞𝐿.  
Putting all these together, we can write the utility function for bank i as: 𝑈=(𝑞) = 𝑣𝑞 − 𝑝 − 𝜃=𝑞𝐿.                                         (1) 
Decision-making Timeline. A general-purpose, fast payment and settlement system typically can be 
constructed and become available in several years. Figure 1 shows a two-stage decision process that 
characterizes the system design choices and banks’ participation timing decisions. At the beginning (time 
0), the system owner will determine the retail payment and settlement system capability 𝑞, start to invest 
in the infrastructure, and announce a fee structure (𝑝?, 𝑝)) such that the first-period (earlier) adopters will 
pay 𝑝? while the second-period (later) adopters will pay 𝑝), and 𝑝? ≤ 𝑝). A bank’s decision problem thus is 
whether to adopt and when to adopt, given its own type and others’ decisions.  
 
Figure 1.  The Two-Period Decision Making Process 
Problem Formulation 
System ownership is important because the owner may build the system capability that fits his own 
interests, determine access fees for the service or how revenue should be split among the participating 
institutions, and thus affect all others’ participation incentives. In practice, interbank payment settlement 
systems can be categorized as either government systems or private sector systems depending on who 
owns and operates the systems. The government systems are owned and operated by the central bank, 
which is also the regulator and monetary authority of the nation. The private sector systems are owned and 
operated by private sector groups, which in most cases are a bank association or clearing house. In what 
follows, we formulate the respective owner’s system design optimization problem under each ownership 
structure. We then propose the government mandate policy. Our purpose is to investigate whether and 
how such a policy would affect the equilibrium outcomes, and under what conditions the government 
mandate is necessary to reach a socially optimal solution.  
System Design under Government Ownership (GO) 
The government regulator (the central bank) is a social planner, who aims to maximize the total social 
welfare. To build a system with government ownership, in practice, it first will call for participation of major 
banks. The infrastructure cost is shared among these banks. Once a payment and settlement system has 
been built, the government will provide it as a national public service to all banks in the financial ecosystem. 
That is to say, 𝑝? = ()AB 𝑞), where 𝑁? is the number of banks that participate in the initial system building 
stage; and 𝑝) = 0. In the following, we normalize 𝜃5 = 1 and simplify notation as 𝜃3 = 𝜃 < 1. Also, we 
assume 𝑣 > 𝜃𝐿 to ensure that at least for low-risk banks the value of the new system is higher than the 
associated liquidity cost, so that they have incentive to use it. The central bank has three strategies: 
Strategy GO1: The central bank sets the system capability such that only low-risk banks will participate 
in the initial system building. High-risk banks have no incentive to participate at all, even if in stage 2 it is 
free to join (𝑝) = 0). Let 𝛿 be the discount factor. The regulator’s problem is: 
The system owner determines 
system capability 𝑞, makes 
infrastructure investment, and 
announces the adoption 
fee	(𝑝?, 𝑝))  
𝑁? ≤ 𝑁	banks each 
pays 𝑝? and adopt the 
system as earlier 
adopters 
Remaining 𝑁 −𝑁? 
banks each pays 𝑝) to 
adopt or remains non-
adopting 
 
0 1 2 
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𝑚𝑎𝑥I		(1 + 𝛿)𝑁?[𝑣𝑞 − 𝜃𝑞𝐿] − () 𝑞)                  (2) s. t.									(1 + 𝛿)[𝑣𝑞 − 𝜃𝑞𝐿] − 𝑝? ≥ 0                                   (3) 
                        𝑣𝑞 − 𝐿𝑞 < 0                                                               (4)  𝑝? = ()AB 𝑞); 𝑁? = 𝜆𝑁 
The objective function (2) is the total value of the system across the two periods subtracts the total 
infrastructure cost and liquidity-related operational cost.5  Constraint (3) ensures that the low-risk bank 
has proper incentive to invest in the first period. Constraint (4) ensures that the high-risk bank has no 
incentive to join in the second period even though the system is free to use.  
Strategy GO2: The central bank sets the system such that only low-risk banks will participate in the 
system building in the first stage. High-risk banks will participate in stage 2 once the system has been built 
and provided as public goods (𝑝) = 0). The regulator’s problem is:  
             𝑚𝑎𝑥I		(1 + 𝛿)𝑁?[𝑣𝑞 − 𝜃𝑞𝐿]+ 𝛿(𝑁 −𝑁?)[𝑣𝑞 − 𝑞𝐿] − () 𝑞)               (5)                           
                 s. t.							(1 + 𝛿)[𝑣𝑞 − 𝜃𝑞𝐿] − 𝑝? ≥ 0                       (6) 
                                                              𝑣𝑞 − 𝑞𝐿 ≥ 0                                                   (7)  
                                (1 + 𝛿)[𝑣𝑞 − 𝑞𝐿] − 𝑝? < 𝛿[𝑣𝑞 − 𝑞𝐿]                        (8) 			𝑝? = ()AB 𝑞);	𝑁? = 𝜆𝑁	
In the objective function (5), the first term is the net utility from low-risk banks across the two periods, the 
second term is the discounted net utility from high-risk banks in the second period, and the last term is the 
system investment cost. Constraint (6) is the low risk banks’ incentive compatibility constraint. Constraints 
(7) and (8) are the high-risk bank’s incentive compatibility constraints: they ensure that a high-risk bank 
would prefer to wait until the second period for a free system access.  
Strategy GO3: The central bank sets the system features that induce both high- and low-risk banks to 
jointly build the system in the first period. The regulator’s problem is: 𝑚𝑎𝑥I		(1 + 𝛿)𝑁?[𝑣𝑞 − 𝜃𝑞𝐿] + (1 + 𝛿)(𝑁 −𝑁?)[𝑣𝑞 − 𝑞𝐿] − () 𝑞)      (9) s. t.					(1 + 𝛿)[𝑣𝑞 − 𝜃𝑞𝐿] − 𝑝? ≥ 0                             (10) 
          (1 + 𝛿)[𝑣𝑞 − 𝑞𝐿] − 𝑝? ≥ 0                                   (11) 
          (1 + 𝛿)[𝑣𝑞 − 𝑞𝐿] − 𝑝? > 𝛿[𝑣𝑞 − 𝑞𝐿]               (12)                                            
           𝑝? = ()A 𝑞); 𝑁? = 𝜆𝑁 
In the objective function (9), the first two terms are the total utility from low- and high-risk banks across 
the two periods respectively, and the last term is the total investment cost. Constraint (10) and (11) ensure 
that the both types of banks will invest in the first period. Note that constraint (11) always dominates (10). 
Constraint (12) ensures that the high-risk bank has no incentive to wait to join in the second period.  
System Design under Private Ownership (PO) 
Under the private ownership, several major banks form an association. They co-build the infrastructure, 
jointly own the new system, and charge a fee for non-member banks to use the new payment services. The 
association aims to maximize their member banks’ total payoffs. It has two strategies: 
Strategy PO1: Low-risk banks form the bank association and build the new system in the first period for 
its exclusive use. It charges a high price 𝑝) to strategically exclude the high-risk banks from joining the 
system in the second period. The bank association’s optimization problem is: 𝑚𝑎𝑥RS,I 		(1 + 𝛿)𝑁?[𝑣𝑞 − 𝜃𝑞𝐿] − () 𝑞)                  (13) 
                                                             
5  Through the interviews with industry experts, we learned that once the system is built, it relies on automatic 
algorithms to match and settle payments at a pre-specified frequency. The system maintenance cost is relatively 
insignificant as compared to the infrastructure cost and liquidity cost. We thus do not model the system maintenance 
cost. Including such a (small) cost component in the owner’s optimization problem won’t affect our results qualitatively. 
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                                            s. t.		(1 + 𝛿)[𝑣𝑞 − 𝜃𝑞𝐿] − ()AB 𝑞) ≥ 0                    (14) 
                                                                    𝑣𝑞 − 𝑞𝐿 − 𝑝) < 0                                    (15) 
        𝑁? = 𝜆𝑁 
Comparing it with GO1, the only difference is that there is an extra term 𝑝)  in the high-risk bank’s 
participation constraint (15). If 𝑣 < 𝐿, then even if the new system is free (i.e., 𝑝) = 0), high-risk banks are 
not interested in adopting it. If  𝑣 > 𝐿, constraint (15) states that the system owner excludes high-risk banks 
from using the new system by strategically setting a high enough participation fee. 
Strategy PO2: Low-risk banks form the association and build the new system in the first period. In the 
second period, high-risk banks use it by paying a fee 𝑝). The bank association’s optimization problem is: 
 	𝑚𝑎𝑥RS,I			(1 + 𝛿)𝑁?{𝑣𝑞 − 𝜃𝑞𝐿} + 𝛿(𝑁 − 𝑁?)𝑝) − () 𝑞)          (16) 
              s. t.									(1 + 𝛿)[𝑣𝑞 − 𝜃𝑞𝐿]+ 𝛿 ATABAB 𝑝) − ()AB 𝑞) ≥ 0     (17) 𝑣𝑞 − 𝑞𝐿 − 𝑝) ≥ 0                                                    (18)       𝑁? = 𝜆𝑁 
In the objective function (16), the first term is the net utility from low-risk banks across the two periods. 
The second term is the discounted payments from high-risk banks in the second period. The last term is the 
total investment cost. Constraint (17) ensures that the low-risk bank in the association has incentive to 
invest in building the new system. The payments (𝑁 − 𝑁?)𝑝) received in the second period will be equally 
shared by the 𝑁? low-risk banks in the association. Constraint (18) ensures that the high-risk bank has 
incentive to join the system in the second period. If 𝑣 < 𝐿, then the bank association must offer subsidy (i.e., 𝑝) < 0) in order to motivate high-risk banks to adopt their system, which would not be optimal as it reduces 
the bank association’s net profit. If 𝑣 > 𝐿, then in the optimal solution, the high-risk banks’ participation 
constraint (18) will always be binding, because the system owner will charge a positive fee 𝑝) to extract all 
surplus from them. Hence, we have 𝑝) = 𝑣𝑞 − 𝐿𝑞.  
System Design under Government Mandate (GM) 
Sometimes, the government and private banks don’t hold the same view. For example, the central bank sees 
the need to move to an advanced new payment system for a nation’s strategic consideration such as global 
competitiveness, but individual banks are not willing to do so due to liquidity concern. To examine what 
would happen in the presence of such conflict and to see what government can do to push the payment 
innovation process, we propose the government mandate strategy: the regulator (the central bank or 
monetary authority in a nation) mandates the migration to a new payments system. That is, both high- and 
low-risk banks are mandated to jointly build the system, share the total infrastructure cost, and adopt the 
new system use. These are the questions we aim to answer: Whether and when such a government mandate 
strategy is beneficial and appropriate, helping achieve the socially optimal solution? How would it affect 
different banks’ payoffs? Will it impose serious issues on banks’ business stability?  
Strategy GM: The optimization problem under the Government Mandate (GM) policy is: 𝑚𝑎𝑥I		(1 + 𝛿)𝜆𝑁[𝑣𝑞 − 𝜃𝑞𝐿] + (1 + 𝛿)(1 − 𝜆)𝑁[𝑣𝑞 − 𝑞𝐿] − () 𝑞)       (19) 
                                s. t.							(1 + 𝛿)[𝑣𝑞 − 𝜃𝑞𝐿] − ()A 𝑞) ≥ 0                                 (20) 
                                                        (1 + 𝛿)[𝑣𝑞 − 𝑞𝐿] − ()A 𝑞) ≥ 0                                 (21) 
Note that the objective function (19) in Strategy GM is the same as that in Strategy GO3. The regulator 
maximizes the total social welfare. Constraints (20) and (21) ensure the two-period net benefits of the low-
risk and high-risk banks are non-negative. The difference between GM and GO3 is that, under government 
mandate, high-risk banks do not have the choice to wait till the second period for adoption because they are 
required to collectively build the new system together with the low-risk banks in the first period. The reason 
we still impose constraints (20) and (21) is because otherwise some banks might be mandated to participate 
for a loss, which might lead to systemic risk and would be detrimental to the stability of the whole financial 
system. The participation incentives still should be satisfied to ensure the public policy objective. 
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Analysis and Results 
All parties’ decision-making is endogenous. The system owner determines the optimal system design, 
taking into consideration banks’ corresponding participation incentives; and banks make decisions on 
whether and when to participate in the infrastructure building and the use of the new system, given the 
system owner’s design choice. In this section, we first present the equilibrium outcomes under the 
government and private ownership structure, respectively. We then compare different ownership structures 
and examine the impact of the mandate policy on optimal system capacity and social welfare.  
Government Ownership 
When the government designs the new system, we derive the following equilibrium outcome. 
Proposition 1. Under the government ownership, the optimal system capacity and banks’ corresponding 
participation strategies are:  
(1) If 𝜃𝐿 < 𝑣 ≤ 𝑣?, the optimal system capacity is 𝑞UV∗ = (?XY)ZA( (𝑣 − 𝜃𝐿). The equilibrium participation 
strategy for banks is GO1: Low-risk banks build and use the new system, while high-risk banks 
completely stay out of this innovation process.  
(2) If 𝑣? < 𝑣 ≤ 𝑣) , the optimal system capacity is 𝑞UV∗ = (?XY)ZA([T\])XY(?TZ)A([T])( . The equilibrium 
participation strategy for banks is GO2: Low-risk banks build the system and use it afterwards, 
while high-risk banks will adopt the new system after it is provided as free public goods. 
(3) If 𝑣) < 𝑣 ≤ 𝑣^ , the optimal system capacity is 𝑞UV∗ = )A([T])( ; and if 𝑣 > 𝑣^ , the optimal system 
capacity is 𝑞UV∗ = (?XY)ZA([T\])X(?XY)(?TZ)A([T])( . The equilibrium participation strategy for banks is 
GO3: Both low-risk and high-risk banks participate in the system building and use. 
The threshold values are given by 𝑣? = 𝐿, 𝑣) = )TY(?TZ)TZ\(?XY)X)√?TZ)TYTZX)√?TZ 𝐿, 𝑣^ = )T(?XY)(?TZXZ\)?TY 𝐿, and 𝑣? < 𝑣) <𝑣^. Figure 2 graphically demonstrates Proposition 1.  
 
Figure 2.  The Optimal System Capacity and Strategy under 
Government Ownership (GO) 
The solid lines in Figure 2 indicate the optimal system capacity under the government ownership. There 
are three regions. When the system base value is relatively small,	𝑣 ≤ 𝑣?, the equilibrium strategy is GO1 
and only low-risk banks develop and use the new system while high-risk banks are left out of this innovation 
game. When the base value of the system is in an intermediate range, 𝑣? < 𝑣 ≤ 𝑣), the equilibrium strategy 
is to let the low-risk banks to build the system in the first period and invite high-risk banks to use the 
services for free in the second period. When the base value is high enough, 𝑣 > 𝑣^, the optimal strategy is 
to induce all banks to co-build the system in the first period. Thus, as the base value of the system increases, 
the central bank should strategically set the system capacity at appropriate levels to motivate more banks 
GO1: Only low-risk 
banks build and use 
the new system
GO2: Low-risk 
banks build the 
system; all 
banks use it
GO3: All banks 
co-build and use 
the new system
𝑣" 𝑣# 𝑣$ 𝑣
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to participate in and contribute to the financial innovation at an earlier time.  
An interesting observation is that the optimal system capacity does not necessarily increase in the base 
value of payment services monotonically, though it does demonstrate a general upward trend as 𝑣	increases. 
Note that there is a significant drop in the system capacity at the tipping point 𝑣) , beyond which 
synchronized co-investment in the new infrastructure and immediate mass adoption from all participants 
occur. The discontinuity occurs at 𝑣) when the strategy switches from GO2 to GO3. The difference between 
the two strategies is that only low-risk banks build a high-capability system under GO2 whereas both low- 
and high-risk banks collectively build a relatively low-capability system under GO3. As the system base 
value increases, the system owner tends to build a high capacity system under GO2. However, as the system 
capability increases, the associated liquidity risk and operating cost increase as well. Under GO3, to 
encourage high-risk banks to co-build the new system in the first stage, instead of just using the system 
after it is built, the system capability cannot be set too high, thus a dip at 𝑣). Although the system capacity 
is reduced around 𝑣) , the social welfare under GO3 is higher than that under GO2 when 𝑣 > 𝑣) , and 
therefore, the optimal strategy switches from GO2 to GO3. 
Moreover, the composition of the underlying banking industry is another factor that the system owner takes 
into consideration in the optimal system capacity design. Recall that the parameter 𝜆 is the proportion of 
low-risk banks in the population. A large 𝜆 represents a concentrated financial ecosystem where there are 
more large banks with sufficient liquidity supply, while a small 𝜆 suggests a diverse financial ecosystem with 
many small banks, which are more likely to be liquidity constrained. Our findings suggest that, all else being 
equal, if the banking industry is more concentrated, i.e., a large 𝜆, the regulator will choose to build a more 
capable system (e.g., faster settlement speed and more innovative features).  
Private Ownership 
Under the private ownership structure, a group of major banks are the owner of the system. The system 
owner’s decision-making problem under the two strategies (i.e., PO1 and PO2) has been formulated in the 
previous section. We solve for the equilibrium and obtain the following results. 
Proposition 2. Under the private ownership, the optimal system capacity, price, and banks’ 
corresponding strategies are given as below.  
(1) If 𝑣 ≤ 𝑣?, the optimal system capacity is 𝑞`V∗ = (?XY)ZA( (𝑣 − 𝜃𝐿). The equilibrium strategy is PO1: 
Low-risk banks build the new system, and charge a price 𝑝`V∗ = max	[(𝑣 − 𝐿) (?XY)ZA( (𝑣 − 𝜃𝐿), 0] to 
exclude the high-risk banks from using the new system. 
(2) If   𝑣 > 𝑣?, the optimal system capacity is 𝑞`V∗ = (?XY)ZA([T\])XY(?TZ)A([T])( . The equilibrium strategy 
is PO2: Low-risk banks build the new system, and charge a positive price 𝑝`V∗ =(?XY)ZA([T\])XY(?TZ)A([T])( (𝑣 − 𝐿) for high-risk banks to use the new system. 
Figure 3 compares the optimal system capacity and the equilibrium strategy under different ownership 
structures. The solid (dashed) lines in Figure 3 depict the optimal system capacity under the government 
(private) ownership structure. When 𝑣 < 𝑣), the dashed lines overlap with the solid lines. Different from 
the government ownership, there is no discontinuity point under the private ownership. 
In the region 𝑣 ≤ 𝑣?, the private system owner takes Strategy PO1, which is equivalent to GO1. Namely, low-
risk banks will build and use the new system exclusively. Under PO1, even if the new system is free to use, 
high-risk banks are not interested in adopting the system. The fact that Strategy GO1 overlaps PO1 in this 
range suggests that the two ownership structures yield the same configuration of system capacity and result 
in the same level of total payoff when the base value of the system is low.   
In the region 𝑣? < 𝑣 ≤ 𝑣), the private system owner takes Strategy PO2, which, again, yields the same 
optimal capacity level as GO2. However, the underlying mechanism is fundamentally different. Under the 
private ownership, the bank association builds the system and charges a fee for those non-member banks 
to access it. It resembles a commercial market where member banks sell innovative payment services to the 
non-member banks at a positive price. Under the government ownership, all banks use the services offered 
by the government for free, so there is no market. In contrast to the government ownership under which 
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high-risk banks earn positive utility, under the private ownership, low-risk banks in the bank association 
extract all surplus from (non-member) high-risk banks. Such a fee represents an internal value transfer 
among banks, and therefore, the total social welfare is the same under the two structures. 
 
Figure 3.  Comparison of the Optimal System Capacity and Strategy 
between Private Ownership (PO) and Government Ownership (GO) 
In the region 𝑣 > 𝑣), the equilibrium strategy under private ownership is PO2, and the system capacity may 
be higher or lower than that in GO3 under the government ownership. The social welfare under private 
ownership is always lower than that under government ownership. When 𝑣 < 𝑣d, the government would set 
a relatively low capacity so that high-risk banks would not perceive the investment too risky, and thus be 
willing to co-build the system together. However, the private bank association, for its own interest, chooses 
to set the system capacity high so that it can charge a high price for the non-member banks to use it. When 𝑣 > 𝑣d, because the base value of the system is high enough, the regulator would choose to attract all banks 
to build a high-capacity system. However, the private bank association deliberately sets the capability lower 
than the social optimum for its self-interest to maximize member banks’ private benefits. Since the 
increased infrastructure cost cannot be compensated by the increased price paid by the non-member banks, 
the bank association decides to build the system capacity level lower than the social optimum.   
Government Mandate 
Next, we explore the Government Mandate (GM) policy, meaning that the government, through relevant 
financial regulations, requires all banks to participate in the payment and settlement innovation. It is 
unclear whether such regulation indeed supports or hurts the economy as a whole. In what follows, we will 
examine how the GM strategy would potentially affect the equilibrium capacity of the new payment and 
settlement system as well as the total social welfare. We solve the regulator’s decision-making problem 
under the GM strategy and get the following result: 
Proposition 3. 1) When the base system value is small, 𝑣 < 𝑣?, the GM strategy is socially inefficient.  
2) If 𝑣? < 𝑣 ≤ 𝑣e ≡ 𝐿(1 + 𝜆 − 𝜆𝜃), then the optimal system capacity under GM is 𝑞Ug∗ = )A(?XY)([T])( . 
3) If 𝑣 > 𝑣e, then the optimal system capacity under GM is 𝑞Ug∗ = (?XY)ZA([T]\)X(?XY)(?TZ)A([T])( .  
Since 𝑞Ug∗ ≥ 0, we first note that the GM strategy is infeasible if the base value even cannot cover the 
liquidity cost for high risk banks (𝑣 < 𝑣? = 𝐿). The government should not set any regulation to require all 
banks to act together to build the new system. Instead, the participation decision needs to be left to each 
individual bank. In this case, high-risk banks will choose to stay out of the financial innovation process. 
When 𝑣 > 𝑣?, we are interested in examining whether and when the GM strategy improves social welfare. 
Since the government ownership (GO) can always generate the same or higher social welfare than the 
private ownership (PO), in what follows, we will use GO as the benchmark. Our results show that it may or 
may not be socially optimal for the regulator to mandate all banks to take the same action together. We find: 
GO generates higher 
social welfare than PO
𝑣" 𝑣# 𝑣$ 𝑣
PO and GO are  equivalent 
in optimal capacity and 
social welfare
𝑞∗
𝑣'
PO
GO
PO/GO
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Proposition 4. The GM strategy improves total social welfare when 𝑣h < 𝑣 < 𝑣^. More specifically: 
1) If 𝑣h < 𝑣 < 𝑣), then the socially optimal capacity under government mandate is lower than that under the 
government ownership:  𝑞Ug∗ < 𝑞UV∗ . 
2) If 𝑣) < 𝑣 < 𝑣^, then the socially optimal capacity under government mandate is higher than that under 
the government ownership: 𝑞Ug∗ > 𝑞UV∗ . 
We find that, from a social planner’s perspective, the GM strategy should be adopted only when the base 
value is in intermediate range (𝑣h < 𝑣 < 𝑣^). Figure 4 illustrates the optimal system capacity under the 
government and private ownership structures, as well as the government mandate policy.  
 
Figure 4.  When Government Mandate is Socially Optimal 
Recall that 𝑣)  is a critical tipping point beyond which synchronizing investment among all players and 
immediate mass adoption would occur under government ownership. If  𝑣h < 𝑣 < 𝑣), we suggest that the 
government regulator should play a coordinating role by executing the GM strategy. Under government 
mandate, low-risk banks accommodate with high-risk banks to build a system with lower capability (𝑞Ug∗ <𝑞UV∗ ) so that the mass adoption tipping point is pushed earlier, from	𝑣) to 𝑣h.   
If 𝑣) < 𝑣 < 𝑣^, we also recommend government mandate. Without it, the system capacity under the GO 
structure is set lower than the socially optimal level. This is because otherwise the very high system 
operating cost will induce high risk banks to push their adoption decision to the second period, rather than 
co-build the system in the first period. Under GM, however, high-risk banks have no such a choice. Overall, 
under GM, low-risk banks are better off and high-risk banks are worse off. The overall social welfare 
improves due to the higher system capacity.   
Impact of Bank Heterogeneity on Optimal Strategy 
In our model, banks are heterogeneous in the expected liquidity costs incurred during the settlement 
process. Denote 𝜌 = [T][T\] as the indicator of the heterogeneity level between high-risk and low-risk banks. 
Because 0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 1, we have [T][ ≡ 𝜌 ≤ 𝜌 ≤ 1. As 𝜃 increases, 𝜌 also increases. The higher the 𝜌 value, the 
more homogeneous banks are in the financial ecosystem. Also note that 𝜌 < 0 when 𝑣 < 𝐿.  
We find that banks’ heterogeneity level 𝜌  plays an important role in determining the optimal system 
capacity, and thus affects the final market equilibrium outcome. Figure 5 depicts our findings.   
There are three critical values in Figure 5, 𝜌h < 𝜌∗ < ?̅?.  Above the 𝜌 line, we show the equilibrium strategies 
under both types of ownership. Clearly, when banks in the underlying financial ecosystem are more similar, 
the regulator would be more likely to induce them to participate in the system building and adopt new 
system together. As Figure 5 shows, when banks’ heterogeneity reduces (i.e., 𝜌 increases), the equilibrium 
strategy under GO structure will move from GO1, to GO2, and eventually to GO3. If banks are quite different 
(i.e., a small value of 𝜌), it might be too costly to let them act in the same way at the same time: in order to 
𝑞"#∗
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motivate high-risk banks to co-build or use the system, the regulator may have to set a very low system 
capacity to make sure these banks can cope with the associated costs. Such a reduction in the system 
capacity, however, will also reduce the total social welfare and thus is not preferred by the regulator.  
 
Figure 5.  Equilibrium Strategy vs. Banks’ Heterogeneity 
Below the 𝜌 line in Figure 5, we indicate the optimal ownership structure. We have the following result: 
Proposition 5. 1) If 𝜌 < 𝜌h , the private ownership is as efficient as the government ownership, both 
maximizing social welfare, and there is no need for government mandate.   
2) If 𝜌h < 𝜌 < ?̅?, the government mandate improves total social welfare.  
3) If 𝜌 > ?̅?, the government ownership is as efficient as the government mandate, both maximizing social 
welfare, and there is no need for government mandate.   
We offer several interesting policy recommendations. First, when banks in the financial industry are highly 
heterogeneous, 𝜌 < 𝜌h , it is infeasible (when 𝜌 ≤ 0) or socially inefficient (when 0 < 𝜌 < 𝜌h) to impose 
government mandate. Instead, it is socially preferred to allow major banks to form association and become 
the innovation leader in building new systems. Sweden is a good example. There are more than 114 banks 
in Sweden. The four biggest banks in Sweden account for more than 80% of the industry’s total assets. So 
its bank heterogeneity is high. Currently the Sweden retail payment system, called Payments in Real Time 
(PRT), is operated by Bankgirot (please refer to Table A1 for detailed features of RPT). Bankgirot is a bank 
association owned by six of Sweden’s largest banks. This is consistent with our finding that, when bank 
heterogeneity is high, large banks can lead the payment innovation and develop a private system. Private 
ownership yields the socially optimal outcome. 
Second, the GM strategy improves social welfare when the bank heterogeneity is in the intermediate range. 
When 𝜌h < 𝜌 < 𝜌∗, GM strategy dominates GO2 and PO2 strategies. The regulator mandates high-risk banks 
to join the new system co-building in the first period, who otherwise will not participate at such an early 
stage, but instead will only become the late adopters of the new system. In the range of 𝜌∗ < 𝜌 < ?̅?, GM 
strategy dominates GO3 strategy.6 Although all banks’ participation action and timing remain the same 
under the two strategies, the optimal system capacity under GM is higher than that under GO3. The system 
will be built with more innovative features and performs faster settlement speed.  
When 𝜌 > ?̅?, banks are more homogeneous, the GM strategy is not necessary anymore. Banks are very 
similar, so they will self-select to act at the same time and in the same way. In such a scenario, although the 
regulator can leave the participation decision to banks themselves (i.e., no need to use GM), the government 
should lead the financial innovation, because private ownership will lead to a sub-optimal system capability 
choice compared to the government ownership. This is what we see in Japan. Compared with Sweden, the 
Japanese banking system, with about 200 banks, has relatively lower heterogeneity. Consistent with our 
finding, Bank of Japan, the country’s central bank, owns and operates the retail payment system Zengin. 
Please refer to Table A1 for detailed features of the Zengin system and its recent innovations. 
                                                             
6 The GO3 strategy under GO structure dominates the PO2 strategy under PO structure.  
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Discussion and Conclusion 
Innovative retail payment systems are one of the most important trends in recent financial innovations in 
the retail banking industry. We have seen global efforts to use advanced technologies to build the new 
infrastructure that supports future payment clearing and settlement services. The new systems in different 
countries vary in terms of ownership, attributes, and architectures. So far, no single best approach has been 
identified, and the social and economic payoffs of the new payment system innovations are still unknown. 
We fill this research gap by developing an analytical framework for individual banks, central banks, and 
government authorities to examine the optimal design of the new infrastructure to support future 
innovative retail payment systems in the economy. Under both the government and private ownership 
structures, we analyze the system owner’s choice of the optimal system capacity, as well as different banks’ 
technological investment and adoption timing decisions.  
We show that different ownership structures result in different optimal system designs. Under private 
ownership, the optimal system capability monotonically increases in the base value of the new system. In 
contrast, under government ownership, the optimal system capability does not necessarily increase when 
the system base value increases. Under both ownership structures, when the system is designed with low 
capability, banks with low liquidity risks will invest in the new infrastructure, while banks with high 
liquidity risk will not be interested in the system adoption. When the system is designed with medium 
capability, banks with low liquidity risks will become early movers to build the new infrastructure, and 
banks with high liquidity risk will become late adopters. Finally, when the system is designed with high 
capability, all banks will synchronize their timing of participation and collectively invest and develop the 
new system. 
When the base value of the new system is lower than a threshold, both the private and government 
ownership structures yield the socially optimal outcome. The private sector can provide a system that is at 
least as efficient as one provided by the central bank. When the base value of the new system is in the 
intermediate range, private ownership tends to offer higher system capability than the socially optimal level. 
The reason is that the government chooses to control the system risk by capping the system capability at an 
appropriate level. A lower system capability in this case reflects the government’s intention to synchronize 
banks’ investment incentives in order to motivate them to participate in this financial innovation process, 
promote immediate mass technology adoption, and lead to higher social welfare. In contrast, when the base 
value of the new system is large, private ownership results in fewer innovative features and lower system 
capability compared to the socially optimal outcome. This finding shows the inefficiency of the monopolistic 
private ownership structure. The private ownership structure constrains the innovation to less than the full 
extent of what is technologically possible. In this case, efforts by the government to improve payment 
system capabilities positively affect the achievement of public policy objectives. Thus, the central bank or 
government needs to establish rules and regulations to monitor compliance.  
In reality, heterogeneity among payment service providers can give rise to coordination challenges. We 
show that the private ownership is an efficient and socially optimal solution to manage the innovative 
payment system if the banks’ heterogeneity level is high. When banks are quite different, the government 
could consider letting the large bank association to play the decision-making role. Using the appropriate 
market mechanism (i.e., the price), the bank association can effectively deter or motivate other banks’ 
participation, generating the equilibrium outcome that aligns the interest of itself as the private owner and 
the interest of the society as a whole. On the other hand, when banks are relatively homogeneous, the 
government should consider playing a coordinating role in orchestrating, or even setting rules and 
regulations to mandate the development and adoption of the new system. The government’s coordination 
leads to earlier mass adoption of the technology innovations and help banks better respond to the FinTech 
new comers’ competition. When heterogeneity is in an intermediate range, it is instrumental for the 
government to use a mandate policy that requires all banks to co-invest and co-build the new payment 
infrastructure. As long as the system capability is carefully established at an appropriate level, such policy 
intervention can improve the social welfare while maintaining the healthy operation of the financial system. 
These findings provide guidance to the government regulators and policy makers in their promotion of 
technological innovation to support the future retail payment services and other Fintech innovations. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Examples: Advanced Retail Payment System Features  
Country System Ownership  Availability Use Cases Speed 
Mexico SPEI Central Bank 24x7 Business and 
consumers 
Real-time 
Japan Zengin Central Bank 24x7 Business and 
consumers 
4 times daily 
United 
Kingdom 
FPS Bank Association 24x7 Business and 
consumers 
3 times daily 
Sweden Bankgiro Bank Association 24x7 Consumers Real-time 
Singapore FAST Bank Association 24x7 Business and 
consumers 
2 times daily 
 
 
Table A2. Examples: Advanced Retail Payment System Capabilities 
System Capabilities Participant Tools Enabled End-User Services Enhanced 
Batch files sorting and 
routing 
Error and fraud detection Intraday reporting for treasury 
management 
Item validation and data 
capture 
Automated reconciliation and 
submission to settlement 
system 
Automated accounts receivable 
reconciliation 
Automated messages and 
reports 
Automated messages and 
reporting 
Automated notifications and 
messages 
Standardized remittance 
information vis ISO 20022 
Automated routing of single 
item for cross-border 
transactions 
ISO-compliant remittance 
information 
Fast bilateral and 
multilateral clearing and 
settlement 
Flexibility for bilateral 
arrangements 
Electronic invoicing 
24x7 availability Real-time monitoring tools Real-time monitoring tools 
Interoperability Corporate participation and 
interface for messaging and 
services 
Account switching services 
 
